One Size Fits All? Heterogeneity and the Enforcement of Consumer Rights in the EU after Faber by Hacker, Philipp
EU Case Law
Philipp Hacker*
One Size Fits All? Heterogeneity and the
Enforcement of Consumer Rights in the EU
after Faber
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) 4 June 2015, Froukje Faber
v Autobedrijf Hazet Ochten BV (C-497/13)
DOI 10.1515/ercl-2016-0009
On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules:
1. Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated
guarantees must be interpreted as meaning that a national court before which an
action relating to a contract which may be covered by that directive has been
brought, is required to determine whether the purchaser may be classified as a
consumer within the meaning of that directive, even if the purchaser has not
relied on that status, as soon as that court has at its disposal the matters of law
and of fact that are necessary for that purpose or may have them at its disposal
simply by making a request for clarification.
2. Article 5(3) of Directive 1999/44 must be interpreted as meaning that it must
be regarded as a provision of equal standing to a national rule which ranks,
within the domestic legal system, as a rule of public policy and that the national
court must of its own motion apply any provision which transposes it into
domestic law.
3. Article 5(2) of Directive 1999/44 must be interpreted as not precluding a
national rule which provides that the consumer, in order to benefit from the rights
which he derives from that directive, must inform the seller of the lack of
conformity in good time, provided that that consumer has a period of not less
than two months from the date on which he detected that lack of conformity to
give that notification, that the notification to be given relates only to the existence
of that lack of conformity and that it is not subject to rules of evidence which
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would make it impossible or excessively difficult for the consumer to exercise his
rights.
4. Article 5(3) of Directive 1999/44 must be interpreted as meaning that the
rule that the lack of conformity is presumed to have existed at the time of delivery
of the goods
– applies if the consumer furnishes evidence that the goods sold are not in
conformity with the contract and that the lack of conformity in question
became apparent, that is to say, became physically apparent, within six
months of delivery of the goods. The consumer is not required to prove the
cause of that lack of conformity or to establish that its origin is attributable to
the seller;
– may be discounted only if the seller proves to the requisite legal standard that
the cause or origin of that lack of conformity lies in circumstances which
arose after the delivery of the goods.
I Facts and Legal Background
On 4 June 2015, the CJEU decided a hallmark case concerning the enforcement of
consumer contracts in European courts, C-497/13 Faber. This case note first
briefly presents the facts of the case and the legal background in European
consumer protection law before addressing and critiquing the two central tenets
of the judgment: the limitation of the principle to produce evidence for consumer
litigation, and the far-reaching reversal of the burden of proof regarding lack of
conformity in the first six months after delivery of a good. I will argue that the
CJEU in both cases, though for different reasons, fails to render a convincing
solution to the problems at issue. I will then close with a proposal for an even
more radical, but perhaps more appropriate way forward for European consumer
law in view of the problems this case has unearthed.
The facts of the case are fairly simple: In May 2008, Ms Farber bought a used
car at the Dutch Hazet garage. In September of the same year, the car caught fire
and was completely destroyed while she was traveling to a business meeting. The
car was scrapped shortly afterwards; this prevented the exact cause of the fire
from being determined. Ms Farber sued Hazet garage claiming damages for the
destruction of the car and of various personal items that had been inside the car.
In the ensuing trial, the Dutch court of first instance did not determine whether
Ms Farber had purchased the car in her capacity as a consumer. The court of
appeals referred the case to the CJEU.
The judgment tackles two main questions relating to procedural matters that
have vast implications for the enforcement of consumer sales contracts in the EU:
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the determination of the status of the party as a consumer ex officio, and the scope
of the reversal of the burden of proof concerning lack of conformity in the first six
months post delivery. Both questions are central to the regime of consumer sales
contracts in the EU. First of all, the specific provisions of EU consumer law, such
as Directive 1999/44/EC, only apply if the buyer concluded the contract in her
capacity as a consumer. This being the case, in sales contracts lack of conformity
is the pivotal point for all consumer rights. All of them, as provided for by Article
3 of Directive 1999/44/EC, presuppose that the good was not in conformity with
the sales contract at the time of delivery. The provision was modeled on and thus
parallels the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).1 When there is
a lack of conformity, the consumer may seek redress, first, by demanding repair
or replacement, Article 3(3); second, subject to additional conditions, by a reduc-
tion of the price or the rescission of the contract, Article 3(5) and (6). For all of
these rights, the key difficulty for the consumer is to prove that a lack of con-
formity already existed at the time of delivery of the goods, since often problems
with (experience) goods will only be revealed over time as the consumer puts
them to use. The European legislator reacted to this issue and, deviating from the
CISG,2 introduced Article 5(3) which posits that ‘any lack of conformity which
becomes apparent within six months of delivery of the goods shall be presumed
to have existed at the time of delivery’ unless an exception prevails. Therefore, the
European legislation provides for a specific form of consumer protection by a
potentially far-reaching reversal of the burden of proof. The judgment at issue
elucidates the understanding of both the concept of consumer in civil proceedings
and the scope of that reversal of the burden of proof. In both instances, the court
provides slightly surprising and highly contentious answers.
II The Principle of Production of Evidence
in Consumer Litigation: A Farewell to
Venerable Traditions?
First, the CJEU confirms that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness shape
the national courts’ decision on whether to investigate of its own motion whether
1 M.J. Bonell, ‘The CISG, European Contract Law and the Development of a World Contract Law’
(2008) 56 The American Journal of Comparative Law 1, 7; see also S. Grundmann, ‘Verbraucher-
recht, Unternehmensrecht, Privatrecht – Warum sind sich UN-Kaufrecht und EU-Kaufrechts-
Richtlinie so ähnlich?’ (2002) 202Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 40, 45–51.
2 Bonell, n 1 above; Grundmann, n 1 above, 55 with n 52.
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a contract was concluded by a consumer when this is in doubt given the facts
adduced by the parties. If relevant for the decision, the national court must
determine the status of the contractual parties (consumer or seller/trader) in the
same way as it determines other legal questions that are prerequisites for causes
of action under national law, even if the potential consumer has not availed
himself of that status. This follows from the principle of equivalence. If, however,
domestic procedural rules prevent the court from undertaking such necessary
classification, the principle of effectiveness demands that the court should never-
theless proceed to that classification if the court has the relevant facts at its
disposal or can ascertain them by making a simple request for clarification.
Otherwise, the consumer would be required to undertake on her own a full legal
classification of her situation. According to the CJEU, this would place an exces-
sive burden on consumers, particularly in fields in which they can represent
themselves before the court without a lawyer. Furthermore, the court adds that
this conclusion is independent of whether the potential consumer was repre-
sented by a lawyer in the specific case or not.
The court thus makes two distinct claims: (i) that the status of a party
(consumer or not a consumer) must, if conditions warrant, be determined ex
officio on its own motion by a request for clarification; and (ii) that this rule
applies even when the party is represented by a lawyer. I agree with parts of the
first and disagree completely with the second claim.
The first claim is perhaps the more far-reaching one. It is tantamount to no
less than the partial revocation of the principle that the parties should adduce
all relevant evidence before civil courts (the principle of production of evi-
dence). This principle flows from the tenet of party autonomy in civil litigation,
which in turn is closely linked to theories of the pursuit of autonomy in private
law in general.3 Since the time of Roman law, it has therefore been a cherished
tradition to have the litigating parties select the facts of the action that they
bring before a civil court.4 This principle of ‘iudex judicare debet secundum
allegata et probata partium’ is generally honored in European civil procedure as
well.5 The parties may freely choose the evidence they would like the judge to
rule on, in her capacity as an independent arbiter; by the same token, they are
3 See generally G. Wagner, Prozeßverträge. Privatautonomie im Verfahrensrecht (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 1998) particularly 86 et seq.
4 See, eg, O. Tellegen-Couperus, A Short History of Roman Law (London et al: Routledge, 1993)
22–23 on the apud iudicem stage of legis actiones; cf also K.W. Nörr, Romanisch-kanonisches
Prozessrecht (Heidelberg et al: Springer, 2012) 188.
5 See the Opinion of R.-J. Collomer, Case C-106/03 P Vedial SA vOffice for Harmonisation in the
Internal Market, delivered on 15 July 2004, para 28–29.
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responsible for all evidence to be produced and presented to the court. In 1995,
the CJEU upheld the ‘principle that, in a civil suit, it is for the parties to take the
initiative, the court being able to act of its own motion only in exceptional cases
where the public interest requires its intervention. That principle reflects con-
ceptions prevailing in most of the Member States as to the relations between the
State and the individual.’6 The judgment under consideration in this note
departs from this tradition by stipulating that civil courts are under an obliga-
tion to make a limited but nonetheless palpable ex officio inquiry into the facts
that determine the status of a party that may be a consumer. The argument that
the CJEU presents, however, points to the central weakness of the principle of
production of evidence. The principle assumes a significant degree of knowl-
edge and rationality of the parties. Only if a consumer is sophisticated enough
to know which facts will make her prevail can she effectively bring an action.
The court rightly notes that many consumers will not be in a position to make
these decisions on their own: they lack legal training, cognitive resources, or
both. If the right to represent oneself in court without legal assistance is given
its full scope, it seems necessary to critically scrutinize and limit the principle of
production of evidence. In such cases of the absence of legal representation, the
courts have already often sought to accommodate the shortcomings of said
principle.7 Under § 139 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, for example, the
court may use its power to direct the trial to make limited factual inquiries
without, however, giving legal advice which might compromise its neutral
stance.8 The CJEU takes these tendencies one step further by requiring, in the
case of consumer law, civil courts to determine the status of the party of their
own motion if necessary and if easily feasible.
If the assumption of limited legal training or bounded rationality on the side
of the potential consumer holds true, the decision provides necessary aid to
consumers in the enforcement of their legal rights. If, however, the assumption is
refuted, the conclusion is unwarranted, contrary to the holding of the CJEU. There
are two potential cases: legal training and close to full rationality of the party. If
the very reason for the ex officio classification is the fear of an excessive burden
on the consumer due to his unfamiliarity with legal proceedings, it seems that the
presence of a lawyer undermines that rationale. The lawyer may be a representa-
6 Joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van
Veen vStichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [1995] ECR I-4705 (CJEU), para 21.
7 See, eg, J. Langbein, ‘The German Advantage in Civil Procedure’ (1985) 52 The University of
Chicago Law Review 823, 826: ‘the [German] court rather than the parties’ lawyers takes the main
responsibility for gathering and sifting evidence’; see also the reference in the following note.
8 C. Wagner, inMünchner Kommentar zur ZPO (4th ed, Munich: Beck, 2013) § 139 para 10.
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tive of the party – or the party herself. As the CJEU has just affirmed in Costea, a
lawyer acts as a consumer whenever concluding a transaction outside of her
profession.9 However, even if a lawyer is enforcing rights flowing from a private
contract, it seems obvious that she does not need legal guidance from the court in
such basic aspects as to adduce the evidence necessary to show, if relevant, that
she acted as a consumer. Here, private autonomy and party sovereignty may
rightfully prevail.10 The second case, full rationality, is less easy to resolve.
Imagine a highly sophisticated, almost fully rational party without legal training,
for example a professor of mathematics. For her, it would not be impossible to
cognitively digest the requirement of adducing facts pertaining to her consumer
status. However, without legal training, she might not be aware of this problem in
the first place. This may even be true if we imagine a party with experience in
commerce, such as an investment banker. Now, one could argue that if they do
not know how to run a trial, they should retain a lawyer. However, this always
introduces the risk of additional financial and the certainty of additional cognitive
costs (of choosing, negotiating etc). The right to universal access to courts is
already highly regressive,11 making it difficult for the less affluent (who may
nevertheless be highly rational) to have their voices heard in court. The factual
use of this right is facilitated by provisions strengthening the possibility of
representing oneself in court. Therefore, even for highly rational individuals, the
decision of the CJEU seems correct since de facto they might not be able or willing
to retain a lawyer.
It would have been more compelling therefore if the CJEU had let the princi-
ples of domestic procedural law, including the principle to adduce evidence,
prevail in the presence of a lawyer. In this case, if the facts necessary to determine
the validity of a cause of action are at the court’s disposal, it may proceed to the
classification. If they are missing, the court must reject the claim. If the potential
consumer was represented by a lawyer, she consequently has to sue the lawyer
for professional malpractice. A reversal of long-established principles of domestic
proceedings – the responsibility of the plaintiff to adduce all relevant facts –
9 See P. Hacker andM. Starke, ‘European Union Litigation’, in this issue, p 152–153.
10 This solution finds a limited analogy in the German doctrine on § 139 of the German Code of
Civil Procedure mentioned above. While the German court must give advice on the necessity of
further presentation of facts, even in the presence of lawyerly representation, this does not hold
true if a conscientious and knowledgeable observer of the proceedings should have been aware of
the necessity to present some particular facts (BGH, Judgment of 5 June 2003 – I ZR 234/00, Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 2003, 3626, 3628), as one may argue to be the case for the status of
consumer in consumer litigations.
11 O. Ben-Shahar, ‘The Uneasy Case for Equal Access Law’ University of Chicago Institute for Law
& Economics Olin Research PaperNo 628 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2197013.
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under the banner of the principle of effectiveness does not seem warranted in
cases in which the consumer is not, by virtue of his lawyerly representation, a
legally naïve party.
III Burden of Proof regarding Lack of Conformity:
Forced or Individual Insurance?
Next, the court addresses the second key question of the case: the exact scope of
the reversal of the burden of proof contained in Article 5(3) of Directive 1999/44.
An interpretation of the CJEU had been awaited by lawyers and scholars with
baited breath since manifold theories had been proliferating to determine that
scope. If lack of conformity becomes apparent within six months of delivery of the
goods, Article 5(3) states that, notwithstanding some exceptions, the lack of
conformity is presumed to have existed at the moment of delivery. Chiefly, it was
unclear whether the consumer only had to adduce evidence that, as a result of
some unknown cause, the good has entered a state of non-conformity (eg, burned
down), or whether she had to establish that the cause of that state of non-
conformity (eg, a motor defect) is attributable to the seller.12 Quite obviously, the
first interpretation entails a much more encompassing reversal of the burden of
proof than the second. The German High Court for Private Law (Bundesgericht-
shof) chose the second alternative as early as 2004 in a case with a fact pattern
similar to Faber.13 The CJEU in Faber, however, unequivocally opted for the first
interpretation by stating that the ‘consumer is required to prove only that the lack
of conformity exists’, being ‘not required to prove the cause of that lack of
conformity or to establish that its origin is attributable to the seller’ (para 70).
Furthermore, according to the CJEU, the consumer must prove that the lack of
conformity became physically apparent within six months of delivery of the
goods. The court argues that the appearance of a lack of conformity within six
months makes it probable that the defect already existed ‘in embryonic form’ at
the time of delivery (para 72). As a consequence, the burden shifts to the seller to
prove that the cause of the lack of conformity can be found in an act or omission
which took place after delivery.
12 See P. Rott, ‘Improving consumers’ enforcement of their rights under EU consumer sales law:
Froukje Faber’ (2016) 53 CommonMarket Law Review 509; S. Lorenz, inMünchner Kommentar zum
BGB (6th ed, Munich: Beck, 2012) § 476 para 4.
13 Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of 2 June 2004, VIII ZR 329/03, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
2004, 2299.
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The very case pattern the court had before it perfectly illustrates the conse-
quences of the ruling. On the one hand, the consumer is insured against the
impossibility (or economic unreasonableness) of determining the true cause of
the lack of conformity. At first glance, this might be welcomed since it will some-
times be difficult for the consumer to ascertain this cause (think of malfunctioning
electronic gadgets), which in turn may deter some consumers from seeking justice
in the courts in the first place. The prevention of such deterrence is a manifest
objective of Directive 1999/44 in the interpretation of the court (see, eg, para 45
and 64 of Faber). On the other hand, it is clear that, as with every expansion of
consumer protection in specific cases, the cost is likely to be borne by all
consumers (at least in competitive markets) as businesses adjust their prices
accordingly to cover the risk of being sued in cases of indeterminable cause of
lack of conformity.14 While such cross-subsidization between consumers is not
per se illegitimate,15 it is at least questionable whether the specific case addressed
by the court was contemplated by the directive.
In fact, the allocation of the burden of proof concerning lack of conformity to
either the seller or the consumer each leads to one type of judicial error. If the
burden is on the consumer, an error occurs if a lack of conformity was present at
the time of delivery and it is impossible for the consumer to prove it retrospec-
tively (Type I error). If the burden is on the seller, a Type II error occurs if lack of
conformity occurs after delivery, but the seller cannot prove this. Let us consider
the example of the consumer buying a bike; imagine the chain is torn apart during
normal use five months after delivery. This can be attributable to a product defect
present at the time of delivery, or to specific use of the bike by the consumer after
delivery (eg, repeatedly hitting stones with the chain while riding off-track). The
solution of the CJEU minimizes Type I error; however, it maximizes Type II error.
There are two reasons why this strategy is flawed.
First, the seller does not have access to the goods after delivery, in contrast to
the consumer. Thus, Type II errors are likely to abound since the seller cannot
observe consumer behavior. In fact, the judgment creates moral hazard for
consumers since it will often be close to impossible for the seller to establish that
a certain kind of nonconformity was caused by post delivery consumer behavior
14 See generally R. Craswell, ‘Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in
Buyer-Seller Relationships’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 361, and, with respect to the situation at
issue, the illuminating analysis by R. Podszun, ‘Procedural autonomy and effective consumer
protection in sale of goods liability: Easing the burden for consumers (even if they aren’t
consumers)’ (2015) 4 Journal of European Consumer andMarket Law 149, 152.
15 It must be underpinned by a robust normative theory, however, see P. Hacker, Verhaltensöko-
nomik und Normativität (forthcoming).
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unknown to him. Under the inverse rule, consumers would at least have the
possibility of observing product quality (and lack of conformity) at the time of
delivery or, alternatively, to have this quality inferred by experts retrospectively.
Thus, the problem of Type I errors seems to be smaller than that of Type II errors.
However, does not Directive 1999/44/EC implicitly contain the minimization
of Type I errors as a normative aim? After all, the need for expert advice on the
cause of lack of conformity may have a deterrent effect on the enforcement of
consumer rights in a number of instances and may be inefficient if the value of the
good is low. Article 5(3) of the Directive thus aims to relieve the consumer of the
necessity for such expert assessments. However, this objective is not without
limits. Recital 8 suggests that the reversal of the burden of proof should cover ‘the
most common situations’. Type I errors thus do not have to be minimized under
all circumstances. Importantly, it may be doubted that the impossibility of deter-
mining the cause of a defect really belongs to the category of the ‘most common
situations’; if at all, this seems to be only the case for complex electronic
products. Furthermore, the probabilistic speculation of the court that defects
surfacing within six months after delivery were likely to have been present at the
delivery in an ‘embryonic form’ lacks any empirical validation. In fact, the state-
ment at this level of generality seems highly implausible, given the wide range of
possible misuses of products by consumers. If cases where it is impossible to
determine the true cause of a lack of conformity are indeed rare rather than
common, individual warranties or insurances covering such incidents, to be
purchased by individual buyers who would like to protect themselves against that
specific risk, seem to be preferable to the forced spread of risk amongst all
consumers in these concrete case settings. This alternative obviously hinges on
the effective and efficient functioning of the market for warranties covering such
risks. Yet a whole industry of selling warranties alongside goods exists in many
contexts of consumer sales. However, the sale of warranties has been fraught with
accusations of exploitation of biased consumer perceptions concerning the like-
lihood of adverse events or the valuation of the product.16 These concerns should
not be brushed aside; but they are better addressed by regulation directly tackling
consumer misperceptions in warranties markets rather than by the generic forced
16 See, eg, R. Chark and A.V. Muthukrishnan, ‘The effect of physical possession on preference
for product warranty’ (2013) 30 International Journal of Research in Marketing 424 (discussing the
endowment effect); P. Jindal, ‘Risk Preferences and Demand Drivers of Extended Warranties’
(2015) 34 Marketing Science 39 (discussing loss aversion); C. Michel, ‘Contractual Structures and
Consumer Misperceptions – The Case of Product Warranties’ Working Paper, available at http://
webmeets.com/files/papers/EARIE/2014/394/ContractualStructures_CMichel.pdf.
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insurance instituted by the CJEU, rendering individual warranty regimes indeed
superfluous in the case at issue.
All in all, more empirical rigor and scrutiny would have been necessary to
align the judgment with the professed goals of the Directive. In line with Recital 8,
the court should have differentiated between products for which the inscrutability
of the true cause is indeed common (eg, electronic products) and those where it is
rare, restricting its holding to the former category. Finally more weight should
have been given to an ex ante perspective by evaluating the consequences of the
case for all consumers, and for sellers, rather than simply proclaiming ex post
what may seem reasonable in a single case. Nevertheless, the CJEU has held
otherwise, and the law will stand as it is.
IV Towards Personalized Consumer Law
Beyond this, the case highlights one of the key problems of contemporary con-
sumer law in the EU and beyond: the problem of heterogeneity.17 Rigid categories,
such as the dichotomies of ‘consumer – seller’ or ‘consumer – trader’, are in deep
tension with the great variety of expertise and sophistication present within each
of these legal black boxes. It is therefore time to critically scrutinize these super-
categories the law has erected in the past decades in the pursuit of consumer
protection.18 While fraught with problems of its own,19 personalized law may
represent a way forward to mitigate these tensions. By using the power of Big
Data, legal norms can be tailored to the individual characteristics of consumers
(and non-consumers).20 For example, regarding the first question addressed by
the judgment that is the subject of this note, the principle that the parties should
produce the evidence should prevail not only where there is legal representation
but also if the data shows that a consumer is highly rational, has business
experience and is affluent enough to hire a lawyer. Under these conditions, it
seems unnecessary to deviate from the principle of party autonomy and party
responsibility. Furthermore, concerning the reversal of the burden of proof, risks
may be socialized (along the lines of the ruling of the CJEU) if the data shows that
17 See A. Schwartz, ‘Regulating for Rationality’ (2015) 67 Stanford Law Review 1373, 1393–1395.
18 Contra Rott, n 12 above, 518.
19 P. Hacker, ‘Personalized Law‘, Working Paper (on file with author).
20 See O. Ben-Shahar and A. Porat, ‘Personalizing Negligence Law’ New York University Law
Review (forthcoming); A. Porat and L.J. Strahilevitz, ‘Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure
with Big Data’ (2014) 112 Michigan Law Review 1417; P. Hacker, ‘Nudge 2.0’ (2016) 24 European
Review of Private Law 297, 321–322.
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a specific consumer is prone to act in a boundedly rational way. In this case, it
may be assumed that she will not pick the right warranty even if she wanted to
(behavioral market failure). Thus, cross-subsidization would be limited to rational
vis-à-vis boundedly rational consumers who are unable to help themselves. There
are important normative reasons, which hark back to our society’s foundation on
mutual respect, inclusion, and fairness,21 which may legitimize such a limited,
personalized rule of forced insurance. The ruling of the CJEU, in all its incomple-
teness, should serve as a pointer to remind the legal community of the urgent
need to re-theorize EU consumer law in the light of relevant evidence from the
social and computer sciences with a view towards tailoring its categories better to
individual needs and preferences.
21 P. Hacker, ‘Overcoming the Knowledge Problem in Behavioral Law and Economics: Uncer-
tainty, Decision Theory, and Autonomy’, Working Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/ab
stract=2632022; Hacker, n 15 above, part 1; specifically on fairness, see W. Fikentscher, P. Hacker
and R. Podszun, Fair Economy. Crises, Culture, Competition and the Role of Law (Heidelberg et al:
Springer, 2013).
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